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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MA VIS E. BA TT and GARY ALAN
BATT. DOUGLAS LAVERNE
BATT. RONALD AARON BATT
and DANIE JAMES BATT. minors.
by their Guardian ad Litem
BROOKE WELLS.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12639

THE STATE OF UTAH and

JACK B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JACK B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against the State of Utah and
Jack B. Parson Construction Company to recover for
the alleged wrongful death of Charles Batt and his
son. David Batt, who were killed in an automobile ac-cident August 26, 1969, on U.S. Highway 89--91, near
the Hotsprings Highway Patrol Station.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a jury trial the court entered judgments
of no cause of action, based upon special interrogatories in which the jury found that:
1. Defendant Parson Construction was not guilty
of negligence.
2. Defendant State of Utah was guilty of negligence; but
3. The negligence of the defendant State of Utah
did not proximately cause the accident;
4. The driver of the Batt vehicle, David Batt, was
guilty of contributory negligence which proxi·
mately caused the accident.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Parson Construction, as one of the defendant·
respondents, respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Parson Construction takes issue with the State·
ment of Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief. The ap·
pellants have related as facts assumptions which have
no support in the evidence. Other facts necessary to
accurately apprize this Court of the matters in question
have not been fully stated and the facts in general have
not been recited in the light most favorable to the jury's
findings. We therefore do not accept the Statement of
Facts by appellants but concur generally with the
Statement of Facts as set forth in the Brief of Respon·
dent the State of Utah.

3
We wish to reemphasize the fact that according to
the testimony elicited by the plaintiffs from Alton Hof..
man, foreman for Parson Construction Company, two
large signs were installed south of the construction
project informing motorists that construction on the
stretch of highway in question was in progress ( R.
503, Ex. p ..39). These signs were reflectorized and
permanently set in place ( R. 694, 503.)
The appellants contend in their "Statement of
Facts" that the driver of the Batt automobile was "ob..
viously" confused by the skip line dividing the south..
bound lanes which was painted by the State of Utah
highway crew in connection with their responsibility of
striping the highway in question. ( R. 533..34, 805..07).
This contention is purely speculative and self..serving
and has no basis in the evidence. Other incorrect or
incomplete statements are made by the appellants in
abstracting the testimony of the witnesses. We refer
the court generally to the State's Brief, pages 6 through
16, for a proper review of the testimony in the case.
In addition, the following should be particularly
noted:
William L. Smith, the State's experienced ( 16
years) project engineer for the construction in ques ..
tion, decided that, due to the proliferation of signs
around the weigh station, two large signs would be
better than three ( R. 567). The reasonableness of this
decision was subsequently reinforced by Daniel J.
Faustman, plaintiff's expert witness ( R. 632).
In addition to these large permanently placed signs,
Witnesses testified to the existence of other visual aids
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in traveling the stretch of highway in question at night.
For example, Officer Jackson noted the contrast in the
color of the black road surface with the light dirt.
gravel shoulder surface, and the weeds which line the
roadway ( R. 726). There was also a white wooden
fence along the east side of the highway which extended some distance south of the accident and whicn
could be seen without difficulty ( R. 727). Officer
Jackson also testified that the headlights of a south·
bound automobile were plainly visible from a point .L
miles south of the point of the accident to a point J
miles north of the accident ( R. 737).
James N. Matlock, a civil engineer employed by
Parson Construction as General Manager, testified
that in his opinion the night traffic was better served
by the use of such visual aids than by temporary signs
and cones which were frequently blown over and des·
troyed and would thus constitute a hazard to traffic
( R. 68 7 691 ) . Mr. Smith also stated that it was bad
practice to leave cones and barricades up at night be·
cause of the hazard to the traveling public ( R. 585).
Officer Gines, plaintiff's witness, described the
position of the Batt tire marks on the highway. He, as
well as Officers Jackson and Horrocks, also testified
from personal observations made at the scene of the ac·
cident that the marks left by the Batt vehicle were
critical curve or scuff marks left by "turning the wheel
severely" ( R. 339, 429, 735,
) . Based on the
testimony of these officers and his own identification ol
the speed scuffs made from the photographs of the
cident ( R. 837), Professor Wagner, automobile colh·
sion investigator for the Department of Transportation
and professor of mechanical engineering at the Univer·
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sity of Utah, analyzed the movements of the Batt vehicle and made calculations concerning its speed ( R.
833-35). The minimum of these speed esti.,mates was 57 miles per hour, a speed 17 miles per hour
in excess of the posted speed limit ( R. 835).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESS
FREDERICK R. WAGNER.

A. The characterization of the tire marks as "cri,..

tical scuff marks" was admissible expert testimony.

The appellants contend that evidence concerning
the critical speed scuffs left by the Batt vehicle was
introduced for the first time upon cross examination of
Officer Gines. Yet the record makes it evident that the
character of the marks was first placed in issue by the
plaintiffs during direct examination of Officer Gines
(R. 338-39) . The testimony extracted from the record
by the appellants on this point was proper cross,..exam,..
ination intended to define and distinguish the marks
referred to by Officer Gines during direct examination.
Cross-examination need not be confined to the specific
questions and details of direct examination. 31 Am.
]ur.2d 553.
The appellants also argue that the character of the
marks as well as the movement and position of the ve,..
hicle making the marks were not proper subjects for
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expert testimony since a layman could just as well inter.
pret the evidence in this regard as the experts.

In preface it should be noted that the appellants
themselves solicited expert opinion concerning the i
character of the tire marks in question ( R.
They evidently felt at the time, as they now concede
on page 21 of their brief, that such questions involve
"complicated and sophisticated scientific knowledge"..
They should not now be heard to say that such questions are within the ken of the ordinary layman.

1

The case of Macshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah2d 152,
434 P .2d 756 ( 1967), cited by appellants, is, at best,
inapposite in the present context. The Court in Mac· '
shara held that the trial court had properly excluded
the testimony of a police officer who attempted to re·
construct the accident from gouge marks on the lawn
and curbing, damage to the vehicles, and the course he
assumed they took after the impact. At the same time,
the Court noted without objection that the officer had
been allowed to make observations concerning damage
to the vehicles and its causation, and to give estimates
of their speed based on skid marks. Id. 434 P.2d at 757.
In the present case, Officer Gines did not attempt to re·
construct the accident in question. He was allowed w·
render his opinion as to the character of the tire marks
left by the Batt vehicle and how such marks were made.
His opinion was based not on assumed facts but on the
measurements and observations he made the night ol
the accident.
The purpose of opinion evidence is to assist the
jury in understanding matters not within common ex·
perience. Hill v. C & E Construction Co., 370 P.2d
(Wash. 1962). Courts have allowed expert testimony i
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as to the character of tire marks as well as the position
of vehicles leaving such marks. The trial court in this
instance did not abuse its discretion in passing upon
the admissibility of such evidence. E.g., Dudek v. Popp,
129 N.W.2d 393 (Mich. 1964); Deskins v. Wood...
ward, 483 P.2d 1134 (Okla. 1971 ); Webb v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah2d 275, 342 P.2d
I094 ( 1959).

B. The testimony of Professor Wagner was prop...

erly based on facts in evidence.

The appellants first assert that there was no evi...
dence of critical speed marks before the court and thus
the trial court erred in allowing Professor Wagner to
base his testimony on that fact. Yet according to the
testimony of three police officers from personal obser...
vations made at the scene of the accident, the marks
left by the Batt vehicle were critical speed marks ( R.
339, 429, 735, 760... 61). The fact that Professor Wag ...
ner later declared upon cross ... examination that he "as...
sumed" the marks were critical speed scuffs is of no
consequence where such assumption was based on
facts "made known" to him by the testimony of other
witnesses. Utah Rules of Evidence No. 56 (2 and 3).
The appellants' contention that Professor Wagner
assumed a ficticious tire configuration is also belied by
the record. His conceptoin of the tire marks including
the cross overs was amply supported by the evidence
(R. 337... 38).
Alleged error is also predicated on the fact that
Professor Wagner based his speed calculations par...
tially on the assumption that Officer Gines had made
one incorrect measurement. However, Professor Wag ...
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ner' s conclusion as to the correct measurement at the
point in question was also based on the facts in evidence. The dimensions of the Batt vehicle indicated
that at least one of Officer Gine' s measurements on the
beginning position of the left or right tire marks was
misstated. Professor Wagner drew the most logical
conclusion as to how the error was made ( R.
The reasons for this assumption were fully explained
to the jury so that they could properly evaluate them in
determining the weight to be given Professor Wag·
ner' s conclusions as to the speed of the Batt automo·
bile ( R.
Appellants offered no explanation
for the obvious misstatement nor have they ever pointed
out a fallacy in Professor Wagner's analysis on this
point. The objection raised by appellants goes to the
weight of the testimony rather than its admissibilitv.
See Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah2d 16, 414 P.2d 575,
578(1968).
The appellants assert that Professor Wagner's tes·
timony should not have been admitted because it failed
to assume there was braking prior to impact. Yet ii
could hardly be expected that the expert assume tha!
there was braking in the absence of the slightest proof
thereof throughout the trial. Indeed, if Professor Wag·
ner had based his opinion on such an assumption, his
testimony would have been defective for the very rea·
son the appellants otherwise assert; it would have con·
stituted an opinion based on facts unsupported by the
evidence.
The appellants also contend that Professor Wag·
ner was erroneously allowed to base his testimony on
discussions with police officers outside of court. But it
has been held that an opinion may be predicated on
statements made to an expert by others where the evi·
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dence introduced in the case showed the existence and
truth of the facts contained in such statements. Thus
in Kastner v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 403 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1965), expert testimony
as to the point of impact in an automobile collision was
held admissible although based largely on a statement
made to the expert by the defendant outside the courtroom, where the defendant testified to the same facts
on the witness stand. Clearly the present case comes
within the above rule. The measurements and character
of the tire marks, as well as photographs of those marks
were clearly in evidence. The fact that the expert also
had a discussion with the police officers concerning
these same matters does not constitute error.
The appellants also object to the fact that Professor Wagner based his opinion on a test for the coefficient of friction on the highway in question taken
three months after the accident. The only difference in
the road surface on the day of the test and the day of
the accident was the normal wear of traffic, which
would have the effect of reducing the coefficient of
friction and thus reducing the estimate of speed ( R.
835). Thus when witness Summers, a materials engineer in the research department of the State Highway
Department, tested the identical road surface material
after it had been placed on the road surface a day or
two, he found the coefficient of friction to be a minimum
of .95. The results of the test on the highway in question taken approximately three months after the paving
of the road surface was .81 in the northbound lanes,
.75 in the south bound lanes. (R. 712). Clearly, the
plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the introduction in
evidence of this later test, especially in light of the
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fact that Professor Wagner based his speed estimates
on the assumption of an even lower coefficient of friction (R. 833).
In summary, under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the
tral court must be deemed to have made the finding
requisite to the admission of Professor Wagner's testimony. Utah Rules of Evidence No. 56 ( 3). Since
Professor Wagner testified from the measurements
taken by Officer Gines, from photographs of the accident scene, and from testimony elicited at trial, it is
clear that the trial court did not err in findng that his
testimony was based on evidence before the court and
therefore admissible. Caperon v. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476,
116 P.2d 402 (1941 ).
c. The appellants' objections are being raised for

the first time on appeal.

It is clear from the testimony extracted by the ap-

pellants in support of their position that their objections
deal with the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Indeed, not once during the course of the trial
did the plaintiffs raise the questions concerning the admission of Professor Wagner's testimony that they
now present for review. The only objection ever raised
was that there was "insufficient foundation" ( R. 833).
An objection must point out the specific ground of the
objection, and if it does not do so, no error is committed in overruling it. A party is confined to the spe-cific objections made by him and can have the benefit
of no others. Wideman v. Faivre, 163 P. 619 (Kan.
1916); 53 Am. fur. 21. Clearly the appellant's only
objection fell far short of apprizing the court of the
specific grounds of objection to Professor Wagner's
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testimony which they now seek to raise on appeal. It
was fatally defective because it failed to point out the
facts which appellants now allege were improperly included ( R. 833). Kuzman v. Cherokee Silo Co., 114
N.W.2d 534, 95 ALR2d 673 (Iowa 1962). Appellants
cannot be heard to complain for the first time on appeal. Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780
( 1944).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 25, AND REFUSING PLAINTIFFS'
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 23, REGARDING SPEED.
The essence of appellants' argument is that Instruction No. 25 was so incomplete in its statement of the
law that it misled the jury as to the legal effect of
driving over the speed limit.
Instruction No. 25 was taken from the language of
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah and reads as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the
driver of the Batt vehicle to drive at such a speed
as was safe, reasonable and prudent under the
circumstances, having due regard to the width,
surface and condition of the highway, the traffic
thereon, the visibility, and any actual or potential
hazards then existing."
"The designated speed limit for the place in question was 40 miles per hour. This means that such
speed should ordinarily be regarded as safe, re.asonable and prudent, in the absence of any special
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hazards or conditions tending to make such speed
unsafe. But any speed in excess of such designated
speed limit would constitute sufficient evidence
to permit a finding that the speed was greater than
was safe, reasonable and prudent, and that such
conduct was negligent." ( R. 142).
The appellants cite in support of their proposition
the case of State v. Lingman, 96 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 451
( 1939). The Court in Lingman, however, was
ily concerned with a Salt Lake City ordinance which
made speed in excess of the speed limit negligence per
se. The Court correctly pointed out that under state
law, a person had the right to prove that a speed in
excess of the speed limit was "reasonable and prudent"
and the Salt Lake City ordinance which conflicted with
state law was therefore invalid. Lingman in no way
controls the validity of a court instruction which de,
dares that speed in excess of law "would constitute
sufficient evidence to permit a finding ... that such con,
duct was negligent." The instruction did not compel
the jury to find that the decedent driver had been neg,
ligent. Nor did it mislead the jury as to the legal ef,
feet of driving over the speed limit. Furthermore, the
appellants were not precluded, as they allege, from in,
traducing evidence as to the reasonableness of the
speed under the circumstances. Despite the precatory
words of the instruction, appellants made no tender of
such evidence to the jury at trial.
Since the cases cited by appellants, as evidenced
by their own brief, deal with court instructions which
made driving in excess of the speed limit negligence as
a matter of law, these cases are inapposite in the pres'
ent context. Moreover, the language of Instruction No.
25 made it unnecessary to further state that excessive
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speed was not conclusive proof of negligence; the Ian...
guage necessarily inferred that it was not conclusive.
See Huber v. Scott, 10 P.2d 150, 153 (Cal. 1932).
Appellants ignore the other claims of contributory
negligence set forth in Instruction No. 23 and seem to
assume that the only possible basis for a finding of
contributory negligence was that of speed. Yet Jn...
struction No. 23 explained, among other things, the
duty of the decedent driver to drive upon the right
half of the road; to keep a proper lookout for other
vehicles and conditions; and to keep his car under safe
and proper control. Considering the position and move...
ments of the Batt vehicle according to expert testi...
mony, the evidence concerning the visual aids available
to the night traveller on the highway in question, and
Mr. Henderson's testimony regarding the conduct and
appearance of the Batt driver shortly before the acci...
dent, the jury could have and it must be assumed to
have found the decedent driver negligent for failing to
observe these standards ( R. 315.-1 7) .

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO SPEED WERE CLEARLY JUSTIFIED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
The appellants argue that there was no evidence
that speed caused the accident. Yet plaintiff's witness,
Henderson, testified on cross examination that he was
driving at a rate of 45 to 50 miles per hour just before
the Batt car pulled along side of his car shortly before
the accident ( R. 315). He admitted that he may have
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been going faster than 50 miles per hour when he
pulled away from the Batt automobile. ( R. 304). Three
police officers testified that the 219 feet of tire marks
left by the Batt vehicle were critical speed marks. Professor Wagner testified from the evidence in the case
that, in his opinion, the Batt vehicle was travelling at
the very least 57 miles per hour. The marks swerved
into the path of the Grundvig vehicle before impact.
Thus the jury could justifiably conclude that the Batt
vehicle had been travelling too fast and that, had it
not been so doing, it would not have swerved into the
path of the Grundvig automobile or even if it had done
so, the driver of the vehicle could have turned to his
right in time to avoid the accident. See W eenig v.
Manning, 1Utah2d101, 262 P.2d 491 (1953). The
trial court properly left to the jury the issue of whether
the Batt vehicle was travelling in excess of a reasonable
and safe speed under the circumstances and whether
such speed contributed to the accident.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IN.STRUCTED THE JURY CONCERNING THE
DUTY OF THE DECEDENT DRIVER TO OB.SERVE AND OBEY LAWFUL SIGNS.
The appellants concede the correctness of the first
paragraph of Instruction 24 which advised the jury
of the decedent driver's duty to observe and take heed
of lawful signs placed for the guidance of highway
users. They take issue with the second paragraph
which explained that failure to so observe and take
heed constitutes negligence.

15

It is generally held that the operation of a motor
vehicle in a manner that violated a statute enacted for
the protection of persons using highways is "negligence per se". Turrietta v. Wyche, 212 P.2d 1041
(N.M. 1948): North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516,
229 P.2d 871 ( 1951): Harris v. Fiore, 423 P.2d 63
(Wash. 1967).

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-23 ( 1953) provides: "No
driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any
official traffic-control device applicable thereto placed
in accordance with the provisions of this act.... "
The appellants do not dispute the fact that the signs
in question were lawful signs. Thus Instruction No. 24,
consistent with the statute, properly explained the general rule with respect to the duty to heed traffic signs
and the legal effect in Utah of disobeying them.
The appellants charge that the instruction was defective because it failed to require a showing of a causal
connection between the injury received and disregard
of the statutory mandate. While it is true that no requirement of proximate cause was specifically reiterated in Instruction No. 24, the jury was clearly informed in Instruction 8 that in order to find the plaintiff
contributorily negligent, it must be found that the plaintiff's conduct assisted in proximately causing his own
injury. Proximate cause was defined in Instruction No.
16. It is well settled that jury instructions should be
considered as a whole in determining their validity and
accuracy. Ewell and Son, Inc., v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
493 P.2d 1283 (Utah, Feb. 10, 1972). Viewing the
instructions as a whole, it is clear that the jury in the
instant case was properly instructed as to the decedent
driver's duty to obey lawful signs placed on the highway and the legal consequence of failing to do so.
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The fact that an instruction was mistakenly given
twice is of no consequence in the absence of any
ing that the jury was thereby misled. Wills v. Tanner
Brothers Construction Co., 439 P.2d 489, 495 (Ariz.
1968). In any event, any possible prejudice was
moved when the duplicate instruction, Instruction No.
27, was withdrawn pursuant to stipulation of counsel
in chambers ( R. 885).
Despite the fact that Instruction No. 24 concerned
the duty of the decedent driver, appellants argue that it
misled the jury into believing that Parson fulfilled its
duty by placing one lawful sign on the highway. The
argument completely ignores the fact that the duty of
Parson Construction Company was clearly set out in
Instruction No. 31 which declared that Parson was
der a contractual duty "to provide adequate warning to
the public by signs, barricades, cones or other devices
or means of any dangerous condition. Parson was also
under a common law duty, irrespective of its contract
with the State, to use reasonable care and means to
warn the travelling public of any dangerous condition."
In light of the explicitness of this instruction, it cannot
seriously be contended that the jury succumbed to the
obscure reasoning suggested by the appellants.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
MITTING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND NO.
17 CONCERNING CAUSATION.
The appellants argue that the definition of
mate cause contained in the instructions submitted by
the court concerning causation should not have been
qualified by the doctrine of efficient intervening cause.
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They cite authority to the effect that where there is no
evidence of any negligence by a third party contributing to the accident, it is appropriate to omit the references to the doctrine of efficient intervening cause. The
question before the court, however, is not whether it
was appropriate to omit instructions concerning the
doctrine, but whether the jury was misled as to the legal effect of contributory negligence so that prejudicial
error was committed. Viewing the instructions as a
whole, it is evident that the jury was not misled as to
the proper application of the doctrine of contributory
negligence. Instruction No. 18 read as follows:
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the
part of a person injured which, cooperating with
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury.
A person making a claim for damages as a result of the injury and death to another who is
guilty of contributory negligence may not recover for any damage suffered, because if the
injured or deceased party were negligent in
causing the claimed injury, death and damage,
the degree of negligence cannot be weighed by
the jury." (R. 136).
On the basis of this instruction, the jury found that
the decedent driver had been contributorily negligent
and that negligence proximately contributed to the accident and thus barred the plaintiff's recovery. Their
findings were amply supported by the evidence and
now come within the general rule reaffirmed as the law
of this State in Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah2d 364,
412 P.2d 451 ( 1966):
"When both sides have been given an opportunity to present their evidence and contentions
to a jury, and a verdict has been rendered, all
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presumptions support its validity. Consequently
it must stand unless the appellant shows that
error was committed which had such an adverse
effect upon the trial that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different in its absence."
Appellants' assignment of error, even if valid,
would constitute harmless error as to the defendant
Jack B. Parson Construction Company. In fact, every
argument espoused by the appellants, with the exception of the alleged effect of Instruction No. 24 on the
jury's conception of Parson's duty, could be conceded
to the appellants and still not justify reversal as to
Parson. In other words, it could be conceded that the
evidence of the decedent driver's contributory negligence was improperly received and that every instructiontion concerning the decedent driver's duty and the
effect of failure to perform that duty was improperly
submitted. Such evidence and instructions could in no
way have altered or affected the jury's finding that
Parson was not negligent.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allow·
ing expert witnesses to identify the tire marks left by
the Batt vehicle as critical speed marks, and in receiv·
ing opinion testimony from a qualified expert as to the
speed of the Batt automobile. The objections to Pro·
fessor Wagner's testimony go to the weight rather
than its admissibility. In fact, the appellants failed to
properly object to the admission of this evidence and
thus cannot be heard to complain for the first time on
appeal. The trial court did not err in instructing the
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jury as to the legal effect of driving over the designated
speed limit or failing to heed lawful signs. The jury
was properly instructed as to the duty of Parson Construction Company and the correct application of the
doctrine of contributory negligence. Their findings in
this regard were supported by the evidence. In light
of those findings, appellants' assignments of error,
even if valid, constitute harmless error as to Jack B.
Parson Construction Company. The verdict and judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted:
CHRISTENSEN. GARDINER,
JENSEN & EVANS
JAYE. JENSEN
Attorney for Respondent
Jack B. Parson Construction Co.

